Consciousness—a system-theoretical approach by Wacław Petryński
OPINION ARTICLE






Ernst-Joachim Hossner, University of Bern, Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Kylie A. Steel, University of Western Sydney, Australia
Joshua L. Williams, Armstrong Atlantic State University, USA
Keywords: consciousness, psychology, motor behavior, human cognition, neuroscience
“Human development has two stages: in
the first we think about things; in the sec-
ond we begin to think about thinking.”
Spiro Agnew
The aim of this work is not to compete
with the paper by Boly et al. (2013), but
rather to look at the issue of conscious-
ness from a different, system-theoretical
perspective. According to advice by Sokal
and Bricmont that “it’s a good idea to
know, what one is talking about” (Sokal
and Bricmont, 1999, p. 185), let us assume
that consciousness is a dynamically chang-
ing part of quasi-static whole knowledge
of an individual, activated by perception
and directed by attention, aimed at dealing
with the task just being solved.
Accordingly, while taking as a crite-
rion the scope of field of information,
the whole body of an individual’s knowl-
edge may be regarded as a potential con-
sciousness. It may be divided into two
parts: stimulated by attention active con-
sciousness and remaining beyond its lim-
its, “sleeping” inactive consciousness. The
“fuzzy” region between them makes a
space for half-active consciousness, com-
monly termed “sub-consciousness.” In this
region the access to needed information is
not immediate, as in active consciousness,
but easier than that in the field of inactive
consciousness.
The other dimension of division—
independent of the former—results from
the fact that knowledge is a mental
representation of reality which may be
described with various codes. The organic
“device” dealing with this issue is the brain,
so the knowledge of its structure and evo-
lutionary history may significantly facil-
itate identification of such codes. Here
instructive may be the commonly known
division into extrapyramidal and pyra-
midal systems. The former may be—
roughly—associated with sensory experi-
ences (stimuli), and thus it may underlie
what may be termed “real consciousness.”
The latter deals with the abstract represen-
tations of reality, stored and processed in
one’s own memory, so it may be termed
“virtual consciousness.”
The presented division may be roughly
associated with Cartesian division into
sensory-mental res extensa and purely
mental res cogitans (Schmaltz, 2008, p.
42), or Pavlov’s first and second system
of signals (Pavlov, 1973, p. 443). A more
detailed division may be traced in the
papers by Carpenter (1852), Hughlings
Jackson (1884). The latter inspired N.A.
Bernstein, who authored probably the
most advanced systemic division of infor-
mation processing in humans, based on
evolutionary, and neurophysiological data
(Bernstein, 1947). Unfortunately, though
Bernstein spoke eight languages, he wrote
mainly in Russian, hence even nowadays
his works are not very popular in contem-
porary science, where English prevails.
Bernstein followed the evolutionary
development of sense organs, nervous
systems, information processing abilities,
and motor abilities of living beings. He
discerned five levels of movements’ con-
struction, tightly joinedwith specific struc-
tures in the central nervous system (CNS),
which subsequently appeared in living
organisms in the course of evolution:
• A-level, rubro-spinal, responsible for
muscle tonus,
• B-level, thalamo-pallidal, responsible
for muscle synergies,
• C-level, cortical, pyramidal and striatal,
responsible for movements in space,
• D-level, cortical, parietal-premotor,
responsible for true representation of
reality, embedded in actual spatial and
temporal constraints,
• E-level, cortical; Bernstein described it
as “group E, lying over operation level”
(Bernstein, 1947), responsible for fan-
tastic representation of reality, free from
actual spatial and temporal constraints.
By the way: Bernstein termed muscle
tonus “background of all backgrounds,”
i.e., a physiological phenomenon underly-
ing all the motor actions, especially in ver-
tebrates. Analogously, the consciousness
makes the mental phenomenon funda-
mental to any voluntary motor operation
as seen from the psychological perspective.
The graphical presentation of Bernstein
five-level movements’ construction system
has been presented in Figure 1 (Petryn´ski,
2008, p. 166).
Unfortunately, Bernstein’s theory in its
“pure” form is too complex to be directly
applicable in practice. To achieve the prac-
tical usefulness, it has to be simplified.
So, based on Bernstein’s evolutionary and
neurophysiological theory, it is possible
to develop an analogous mental struc-
ture including the following modalities of
information processing:
• A-level—intrinsic stimuli,
• B-level—extrinsic contact stimuli,
• C-level—extrinsic remote stimuli,
• D-level—verbal code,
• E-level—symbolic code (Petryn´ski and
Feigenberg, 2011).
It is worth noticing that in such a
“modalities’ ladder” (ML) A, B and C
levels are “driven” by physical stimuli,
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FIGURE 1 | The system of movements’ control levels according to N.A. Bernstein.
whereas the D and E levels are “powered”
by purely mental representations of envi-
ronment, where any connection with
reality is possible, indeed, but not nec-
essary. The “common denominator” of
Bernstein’s model andML is the same, sys-
temic structure. The final product of the
information processing system is a move-
ment, even if merely that of jaws and
tongue.
Symptomatically enough, also Rochat
(who did not refer to Bernstein) devel-
oped a five-level model of self-awareness
(Rochat, 2003). Though it is not identical,
in general it conforms with ML.
Such differentiation of information
processing modalities assigned to partic-
ular levels remains in keeping with the
scales’ conformity premise by Morawski
(2005, p. 162). It states that each level
of a system has its own information pro-
cessing modality, as well as temporal and
energetic scales of physical phenomena.
Accordingly, just the information process-
ing modality makes—to great extent—a
specific identity of a given level.
In physics one of the especially impor-
tant laws is the “correspondence rule”
formulated by Jammer (1966). It states—
roughly—that at the border region of
quantum and classical physics the laws that
determine the run of events coincide with
each other. Analogously, in the ML there
are four such “border regions,” hardly
liable to experimental research, yet espe-
cially promising scientifically: A–B, B–C,
C–D and D–E. Moreover, only the modal-
ities from adjacent levels are to some
extent mutually translatable. For exam-
ple, it is not possible to explain verbally
(D-level) how to hold (B-level) an egg
strong enough to prevent it from falling
down, but not to crush its shell. So, the
psychology and motor control are more
complex than e.g., physics, what remains
in keeping with the classification devel-
oped already in 19th century by Comte
(2012, pp. 152–154). Summing up, while
seen from system-theoretical perspective,
the ML makes a specific “skeleton” of con-
sciousness that enables most efficient solv-
ing a current task. Even if it includes only
mental diagnosis of a given situation in
environment.
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